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Introduction
The interest in genetics has never been greater than today. Every scientific ad-
vance in this field is very often publicized either with enthusiasm or with scepti-
cism. There seems to be no balanced opinion on this topic, at least in mass media 
and public opinion. A very heated debate concerns an important yet controver-
sial genetic issue, i.e. genetic testing. Indeed, there are still many ethical and legal 
questions arising from the use of one particular type of genetic tests, i.e. predic-
tive genetic testing. These genetic tests are normally used in asymptomatic per-
sons to predict future risk of disease.
One of the main points about these tests is that they predict susceptibility, not the 
certainty of developing diseases connected to gene mutations detected with ge-
netic tests. It is a subtle yet relevant difference. In the past, but also in the present, 
political, criminal, and social decisions have been made on the feeble assumption 
of susceptibility.
In general, the topic of genetic testing has a transverse meaning. Indeed, from a 
theoretical-legal viewpoint, this issue can be considered as a particular element DetermInISm anD Free WILL In the age OF genetICS SILvIA SALARDI 
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of a bigger puzzle dealing with fundamental topics, which have been investigated 
for centuries.
I refer, on the one hand, to the relationship between Science and Law. On the oth-
er hand, to the possibility of considering human beings free, despite the causal de-
termination of their behaviour: free will v determinism. In this paper, I investigate 
these old, yet still at the centre of philosophical, legal, and to some extent scien-
tific concerns, to find out which could be the most adequate ethical and legal ap-
proach to scientific advances, that can be useful for human kind to really improve 
the quality of life without turning each human being into a molecular entity. 
Genetic tests can be used for different purposes, such as medical research or crim-
inal investigations. The paper deals with the use of predictive genetic tests in 
medical research. I limit my discussion to those advances in genetics which try 
to overcome the limits represented by our genetic make-up, in particular by gene 
mutations that lead, or could lead, to the development of genetic diseases. I do 
not deal with genetic enhancement of non-pathological traits1. 
The general philosophical framework is based on the perspective of the Is-Ought 
Question, and on the meta-ethical view of non-cognitivism and non-objectiv-
ism. Besides the ethical issues concerning the topic of the current discussion, the 
reader will also find an evaluation of the legal provisions elaborated at the differ-
ent levels of the legal order (international, European, and national). The aim of 
this evaluation is to find out which model of Law is being adopted in bioethical 
issues like the one discussed in this paper. The paper underlines and argues how 
Law can contribute (and has already contributed at the different levels: Interna-
tional, European, and national) to value and to spread an ethics of responsibility. 
In the following paragraphs, I will try to answer the following question:
What are the ethical and legal questions arising from the use of predictive 
genetic tests?
The answer takes into account two aspects: On the one hand, the historical 
framework in which genetic determinism has its roots; on the other hand, 
the management and use of genetic information. As for the first point, ref-
erences to past experience, in which the theory of (biological) determinism 
found legal implementation (Positivist School of Criminolgy v Classical 
School of Criminology), contribute to the understanding of how to balance 
both risks and benefits of current genetic advances by avoiding past mis-
takes. As for the second point, the focus will be on genetic information as 
the core aspects of privacy protection intended in a broad sense. 
1   On the different uses of genetic engineering see for instance Balistreri 2011.COntemPOrarY ISSUeS In BIOethICS: the natIOnaL anD regIOnaL COnteXt
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Law and Science: A controversial relationship
If I followed the ‘traditional’ way of framing issues in Philosophy of Law, I would 
begin by making some ethical statements on genetics, in general, and on genetic 
testing in particular, and then I would draw the legal conclusions by considering 
if my ethical positions have been translated into legal provisions at the various 
levels of legal order. 
However, I would like to start with the legal findings on this topic, and then draw 
the ethical conclusions. The reason for proceeding in this way is that, in my opin-
ion, there are enough good examples both from past and present legal experience, 
that contribute to give an orientation and a direction to the more general, and still 
incredibly controversial, ethical debate on this issue. 
The legal experience I refer to is made up both by legally binding and non-legally 
binding (yet legally relevant, soft law) documents. For those who have little ex-
perience of law, this distinction may sound unclear, and in need of a clarification. 
Therefore, I will clarify briefly this point. In the legal debate concerning the rele-
vance of soft law documents, some authors still argue that, as it is hard to identify 
a clear hierarchy of norms (Knoppers 2006), it is difficult, if not impossible, to say 
what is legally regulated and what is not, and the consequence is a legal vacuum. 
This statement has, legally speaking, no foundation2. Rather, it serves some ideo-
logical purpose like excluding the existence of a quite coherent regulatory frame-
work for genetic issues (Salardi 2010: 102), especially on the part of those scien-
tists and researchers who fear legal constraints on their activity. In the following 
analysis, I will demonstrate that there is no legal vacuum on genetic testing, and 
I will bring evidence for the existing coherent (with certain ethical assumptions) 
legal framework. 
For a long time, Science and Law have been considered as the two opposites of an 
insurmountable dichotomy. This is mainly due to researchers’ perception of Law, 
on the one hand, as a tool to impose both procedural and substantial constraints 
on scientific research, without any benefit even for the patients, and on the   other 
hand, as a rigid and formalistic system of general, abstract rules incapable of 
adapting to concrete cases. Isn’t this an overly narrow and ideologically connoted 
perception of Law? If the answer is positive, then I have to prove the view false. 
This I will do in this paragraph by means of (selected) existing legal provisions. 
2   Jurists, lawyers and judges do have the necessary legal tools for interpreting and recon-
structing the hierarchy of norms. The traditional distinction between soft law and hard law is 
not so rigid as it used to be. For example, in environmental matters, soft law is now essential 
in creating a general consensus for the further implementation of legally binding documents. 
And indeed, the legal relevance of soft law is proved by them being often mentioned in 
the Preamble (integral part of treaties as far as their interpretation is concerned, see Art. 31 
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) of legally binding documents.DetermInISm anD Free WILL In the age OF genetICS SILvIA SALARDI 
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In 1988 the European Parliament declared its intention of evaluating and assess-
ing social, economic, ecological, health, ethical and legal aspects of new develop-
ments in the field of genetic engineering in a Resolution (A2-327/88) on the ethi-
cal and legal problems of genetic engineering. This Resolution takes into account 
many aspects of genetic analysis to be found later in other legal documents. The 
most important concerns about genetic testing that the Resolution (A2-327/88) 
refers to fall under the following headings: First, informed consent as the exclu-
sive basis for all genetic analysis (medical research, selection of workers on ge-
netic criteria and so on), including the right to refuse genetic tests, the right not 
to know the results as well as the duty of the physician not to inform others, in-
cluding family members, without the patient’s consent. Second, the absolute pre-
cedence of patient’s right to self-determination over economic pressures of any 
kind. Third, a ban on the use of genetic analysis for “positively improving the 
population’s gene pool”. Fourth, the prohibition on the development of genetic 
strategies for the solution of social problems. Fifth, insurance companies have no 
right to demand that genetic testing being carried out before and after the conclu-
sion of an insurance contract. Sixth, genetic analysis in legal proceedings should 
be admissible only in exceptional circumstances to be determined by the judge 
alone and in certain limited areas; only those elements of a genome analysis may 
be used which are relevant to the case and do not allow conclusions to be drawn 
as to the genotype as a whole.
This brief summary of the Resolution’s content shows how, twenty years before 
the GINA3, and some years before the UNESCO Declarations4, the European Par-
liament had already taken positions on those controversial issues that will some 
years later explode in legal cases on genetic discrimination, especially in the US. 
The Resolution 1988 represents, in fact, a good example of a proper appreciation 
of the risks of genetic manipulation, and of the potential misuse of genetic in-
formation as well as of the benefits of genetic engineering. This attempt to bal-
ance risks and benefits is a widely shared characteristic of all the legal rules (in-
ternational, European, national) on genetic testing. Indeed, given the risks of 
potential misuse5 (genetic discrimination and surveillance society), legally, and 
3   Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act approved by the US Congress in 2008.
4   Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), International Dec-
laration on Human Genetic Data (2003), Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights (2005).
5   For instance GINA 2008: “New knowledge about genetics may allow for the development 
of better therapies that are more effective against disease or have fewer side effects than cur-
rent treatments. These advances give rise to the potential misuse of genetic information to 
discriminate in health insurance and employment. (2) The early science of genetics became 
the basis of State laws that provided for the sterilization of persons having presumed genetic 
‘‘defects’’ such as mental retardation, mental disease, epilepsy, blindness, and hearing loss, COntemPOrarY ISSUeS In BIOethICS: the natIOnaL anD regIOnaL COnteXt
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  non-legally binding documents (ethical codes as well6) do not prohibit genetic 
testing7 (Salardi 2010). On the contrary, they do point out the new opportunities 
offered by genetic testing, technologies, and research for individuals thanks to 
medical progress8. So, it can be said that Law in this context tries to balance con-
flicting interests (right to scientific research, right to self-determination, right to 
non-discrimination, right to privacy etc.), and to avoid indulging in the crudest 
sort of genetic determinism, recognizing that the genetic make-up of human be-
ings, although an essential part of our being, does not fully determine a persons’s 
character, in the sense that the developmental steps from the genotype to the phe-
notype need integrations with other elements and factors in order to assert that 
human beings are Moral Agents. One of the best legal example of this assumption 
is Article 3 of the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, according 
to which: “each individual has a characteristic genetic make-up. Nevertheless, a 
person’s identity should not be reduced to genetic characteristics, since it involves 
complex educational, environmental and personal factors and emotional, social, 
spiritual and cultural bonds with others and implies a dimension of freedom”. 
This Article, although briefly and generally formulated, as it usually happens with 
articles in universal declarations, best expresses the general legal trend with re-
gard to scientific advances. This trend is not arbitrarily founded, but it is scien-
tifically informed by the overcoming of the simplistic dichotomy between Nature 
and Nurture, and by the acceptance of the gene-environment interplay9 (Rutter et 
al. 2006) following the trend in medicine. The above mentioned legal framework 
appeals, on the one hand, to the scientific knowledge of the reciprocal influences 
between biological and cultural evolution, refusing “the claim that our nature is 
our biology” (Buchanan 2011: 7) as it is misleading, and on the other hand, it sus-
tains, philosophically and ethically, the perspective that does not oppose cultural 
to ’biological’ causes. Indeed, the legal approach to scientific advances in genet-
ics refuses both strict determinism as well as the agency theory, and indetermin-
ism. As for genetic testing, the law adopts a compatibilist stance, in particular the 
among other conditions. The first sterilization law was enacted in the State of Indiana in 
1907. By 1981, a majority of States adopted sterilization laws to ‘‘correct’’ apparent genetic 
traits or tendencies. Many of these State laws have since been repealed, and many have been 
modified to include essential constitutional requirements of due process and equal protec-
tion. However, the current explosion in the science of genetics, and the history of sterilization 
laws by the States based on early genetic science, compels Congressional action in this area...”.
6   Article 46 on Predictive Genetic Tests of the Italian Code of Medical Ethics.
7   This is true of all the legal documents concerning this topic, for a wider analysis, see Sala-
rdi 2010. 
8   See for instance GINA 2008, sec. 2 Findings; Preamble of the International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data (2003), Art. 12 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine (1997) etc.
9   Acceptance of the gene-environment interplay in medicine is quite recent (1990s).DetermInISm anD Free WILL In the age OF genetICS SILvIA SALARDI 
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  normative compatibilism (Grim 2007) which is rooted in Strawson’s distinction 
between reactive attitudes and objective attitudes (Strawson 1982). Strawson, as 
did also for instance Mario Calderoni10 a century before him in Italy, tries to recon-
cile determinists and anti-determinists by considering that the traditional caus-
al explanation of human actions is incomplete if referred to and used to clarify 
the “ordinary inter-personal relationships”. According to Strawson, in the various 
kinds of normal relationships we can have with other people, we are usually prone 
to react to their attitudes and intentions demanding “some degree of goodwill or 
regard on the part of those who stand in these relationships to us” (Strawson 1982: 
63). However, under some circumstances we tend to fall into objective attitudes 
towards some agents as we see them “in a different light from the light in which 
we should normally view one who has acted as he has acted” (Strawson 1982: 65), 
for instance in those cases in which the agent’s attitudes are “partially or wholly 
inhibited by abnormalities or by immaturity”.
In Strawson’s perspective, we find the core elements of the modern compatibil-
ist approach to the relationship between freewill and causal explanation of hu-
man behaviour. What I would like to underline in his theory is the fact that “free 
action…is action that reliably tracks the agent’s values or reasons for action”. The 
relevant aspect is the emphasis on normativity, which characterizes moral judg-
ments. “If freedom of choice is not a metaphysical property but an evaluative sta-
tus, metaphysical determinist arguments will be simply off target. The ‘could not 
have done otherwise’ concept that appears in determinist arguments is a descrip-
tive property of events. The ‘could have done otherwise’ concept crucial to our 
moral judgments, in contrast, may be something very different: part of a locus of 
concepts to be understood not in terms of the metaphysics of causality but the 
normative evaluation of action” (Grim 2007).
The compatibilist approach allows the orientation of political, social, and legal 
decisions in a way that can be helpful to safeguard individual self-determination 
and moral responsibility. This leads to scientific advances being used to amplify 
and not to limit individual freedom. I will come back to this point later.
With regard to predictive genetic testing, it can be stated that the law has followed 
this path. Indeed, although predictive genetic tests can be used, and in the (not 
10   Mario Calderoni was an Italian philosopher who lived in the XIX and XX centuries. He 
tried to overcome the dichotomic approach to human actions used both by determinists and 
anti-determinists. He distinguished between voluntary and involuntary actions, but he did 
not consider the two types of actions as opposed, rather he depicted instincts, impulses, and 
passions (involuntary actions) as the raw material for the voluntary action, in which another 
element plays a fundamental role, i.e. the set of believes according to which we interpret 
others’ actions as well as ours. In the current Italian philosophical and bioethical context, 
Calderoni’s theory has been carefully revisited by Borsellino 2009.COntemPOrarY ISSUeS In BIOethICS: the natIOnaL anD regIOnaL COnteXt
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so distant11) past they have been used, for instance, to deny access to insurance 
policies or to work, and hard determinism has been used to shape certain crimi-
nal policies, the law in the age of genetics has adopted a non-prohibitionist ap-
proach. This choice is in line with the idea of law as a choosing system, which in 
some degrees guarantees the ability “to predict and plan the future course of our 
lives within the coercive framework of the law” (Hart 1968: 181). Indeed, despite 
the potential (but also real) danger of genetic tests, legal provisions at the interna-
tional, European, and national level do not prohibit the use of genetic tests, they 
only limit their uses to medical purposes and to medical research as stated for ex-
ample in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997). 
What is certainly forbidden is genetic discrimination and stigmatization. This 
prohibition is indirectly expressed in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(1948), in the Nuremberg Code (1949), in the Helsinki Declaration (1964). It is di-
rectly expressed in the three UNESCO’s Declarations: The Universal Declaration 
on Human Genome and on Human Rights (1998), The Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights (2003) and in The International Declaration on Hu-
man Genetic Data (2005).
At the European level, genetic discrimination is prohibited (among others) by the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), by Art. 11 of the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), by Art. 6 of the Reccomendation (2006) 4 
of the Committee of Ministers to the member states on research on biological ma-
terials of human origin; by Article 4 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purpos-
es. At the national level, for instance in the Italian legislation, this prohibition is 
expressed in the Privacy Code (legislative Decree 196/2003) as well as in other le-
gally binding acts concerning the use of biological samples (like the General Au-
thorization for processing genetic data, i.e. Autorizzazione al trattamento dei dati 
genetici del Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 22 February 2007, rela-
tivo alle modalità di trattamento del prelievo e utilizzo dei campioni biologici e 
relativi dati’, elaborated by the Italian Data Protection Authority).
Many legal provisions, with regard to biobanks, also underline the primary role 
of self-determination expressed  through  informed consent.  Ethical questions 
in the biobanking sector arise with regard to genetic information, in particu-
lar with reference to storage, management and use of biological materials from 
which the information derives, sincewe can identify individuals by means of ge-
netic information (as is the case of National DNA databases for criminal inves-
tigations), and also acquire information on individuals’ immutable characteris-
tics, like   susceptibility to pathologies. With regard to this second aspect, in legal 
11   For instance: Havasupai Tribe vs. Arizona State University 2010; Newborn Blood Spot 
Litigation 2010.DetermInISm anD Free WILL In the age OF genetICS SILvIA SALARDI 
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  literature12 and documents13 it has been suggested that genetic information dif-
fer from sensitive, personal data, and have a special status, therefore they are in 
need of a special legal protection. In this sense the main problem is how to ano-
nymize the biological material. The proper solution is to anonymize the name of 
the donor, not totally, but by attributing a code to the sample in order to be able to 
communicate the results of the research. This method presupposes a signature of 
informed consent on the part of the donor with regard to the current and future 
uses of his/her sample.
Some international organizations (American Society for Investigative Patholo-
gy, Association of American Medical Colleges, WHO, and some national bioeth-
ics committee) support the “blanket informed consent” as the most efficient and 
economic form of consent, as it is given once and for every present and future 
research project on biological samples. There are, however, other organizations 
like The American Society on Human Genetics, which are against the “blanket in-
formed consent” as they consider it a violation of individuals’ self-determination.
The solution to this dilemma can be found in the already existing legal provisions 
that regulate the storage and management of biological samples at the interna-
tional and European level. In fact, they state a regulatory framework shaped by 
the self-determination principle as referred to the professional behaviour of dif-
ferent actors.
For instance: Art. 3, 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Righs of the European Union, 
which states that the informed consent of the interested person must be respect-
ed, and in Art. 8 which gives the right to protection of personal data and that “such 
data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent 
of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone 
has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and 
the right to have it rectified”; Rec. (97) 5 which provides a very detailed regulation 
of genetic data and of the right to be informed; Rec. (92) 3, on genetic testing and 
screening for health purposes; Art. 5 self-determination Recommendation (2006) 
4 on research on biological materials of human beings; Directive 2004/23/EC on 
setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, pro-
cessing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells; Direc-
tive 2002/98/EC setting standards of quality and safety for the   collection, testing, 
processing, storage and distribution of human blood and blood components.
12   For instance, in Italy, Stefano Rodotà argues in favour of genetic exceptionalism, where-
as Amedeo Santosuosso has changed his mind on this point, being now against genetic 
  exceptionalism. 
13   See for instance Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Ge-
netic Data, 2004 (12178/03/EN WP 91); Article 13 of the International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data. COntemPOrarY ISSUeS In BIOethICS: the natIOnaL anD regIOnaL COnteXt
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Free Will or Determinism? Is this the question?
Genetic determinism is a “new” version of the old philosophical-scientific thesis 
of hard determinism. Determinism is the view that every event, including human 
cognition, behaviour, decision, and action, is causally determined by an unbro-
ken chain of prior occurrences. Determinists believe the universe is fully governed 
by causal laws resulting in only one possible state at any point in time. Hard de-
terminism had been proven false both on philosophical and scientific levels. In-
deed, with regard to the latter, in the nineteen thirties, “modern physics, through 
Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy, has loosened Laplacian determinism 
sufficiently to allow uncaused atomic events, creating in certain specifiable situa-
tions the occurrence of genuine chance… Physics thus makes understandable the 
occurrence of chance, of true alternatives upon which the course of events can 
seize. Physics alone, in its present state, can account for unpredictable, erratic hu-
man behaviour” (Margenau 1967). With regard to the former aspect, many philos-
ophers all over the world (Glover, Lucas, Hospers, Calderoni etc.), have developed 
valid theories to find a balanced approach to the determinists v anti-determinists 
debate. As I suggested before, Peter Strawson’s theory, is one of the best example 
of this attempt of reconciliation. 
I have already dealt with this topic in the previous paragraph. At this point of my 
discussion I would like to mention the legal impacts, that the deterministic theo-
ry had in the XIX century in Europe, in particular in criminal policy and law. 
In the second half of the XIX century, two Schools of Criminology shared the scene 
in the Italian criminal debate14. On the one hand, the Positivist School of Criminol-
ogy, which, as the scientific method became the major paradigm in the search for 
all knowledge, tried to find evidence for scientific objectivity in the measurement 
and quantification of criminal behaviour. On the other hand, the Classical School 
of Criminology focused on the moral liability of participants considered as moral 
agents. According to this view, the legal evaluation took primarily into account the 
characteristics of the crime (actus reus) and the means rea (states of mind) as two 
essential elements of criminal liability. Instead, the Positivist School’s focused on 
the offender’s dangerousness, and on his/her intrinsic characteristics (Ferri 1923), 
whereas the crime played a very little role in legal evaluation.
By changing the assumptions of criminal liability, the Positivist School was ac-
tually seeking to introduce a different model of criminal law. In this light, crim-
inal law should have been used as a social prophylaxis, and individual liability 
transformed in an absolute social responsibility. The Positivist School, whose 
14   The debate started in Italy, but it soon spread all over Europe, as it is documented by 
Jiménez de Asùa 1923. Argentina’s criminal code was influenced by Ferri’s Social Defense 
Theory.DetermInISm anD Free WILL In the age OF genetICS SILvIA SALARDI 
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  world-wide known expertises were Cesare Lombroso and Enrico Ferri, adopted 
the scientific (experimental) method as the unique basis for a ‘new’ criminal sci-
ence, and a new criminal law. In their view, social order was assimilated to the 
natural order, and therefore, it was assumed to function according to the princi-
ple of causality. In this sense what counted was how society could have been best 
preserved from socially dangerous agents. The technique proposed by Ferri was 
rooted in the Social Defense Theory which led to the classification (Marro 1887; 
Fornari et al. 1996) of agents in accordance with their potential social dangerous-
ness, and the preservation of society from these dangerous agents by means of 
preventive and eliminative measures (Ferri 1929). 1921 Ferri’s proposal was used 
to elaborate a Draft Criminal Code, termed Progetto Ferri, whose Section 20 (1) 
clearly stated: the degree of liability for a crime depends “on the dangerousness 
of the criminal determined within the limits prescribed by law, according to the 
gravity of a particular criminal offence and other specific circumstances, motive, 
and the personality of the criminal”. Sentencing was, in large part, at the discre-
tion of the judge. While the above-mentioned section required that the penalty 
should be within the limits prescribed by law, subsection 75 (2), for example, per-
mitted penalties exceeding the maximum sanction by up to one-third if several 
factors of greater dangerousness were present. This Draft never became law in It-
aly, but the Positivist School’s approach can be traced in current legal provisions 
at the highest levels of legal systems. Indeed, today’s Rule of Law (at least in West-
ern democratic nations) has maintained the Classical School’s view in legal sys-
tems, preserving, however, strict liability for some crimes. A good example of this 
legal structure is the Italian legal order. Indeed, the Italian Constitution (Art. 27) 
provides mens rea as the main criterion for criminal liability, but it also consid-
ers (Art. 25) reduction and preventive measures (proper of the Positivist School of 
Criminology) for some particular cases listed in criminal Acts. 
The example mentioned shows how useless it is to reason on the basis of unde-
servedly opposed theories to claim either free will or determinism as the truth of 
human nature. There are things, like our genetic make-up, that can perhaps be 
enhanced, but we are not free to choose. Similarly, if we think that we are just our 
genetic make-up, it follows that no choice is possible in our life. What is then the 
path we should follow? The path has already been chosen, and translated into the 
regulatory framework I have underlined before. It is the path of reconciliation be-
tween scientific advances, their casual explanation of the understanding of hu-
man behaviour, and the ethical view of human beings as Moral Agents. This posi-
tion can be summarized in the words of an Italian acute philosopher of law, that 
from a non-cognitivist and non-objectivist point of view (“ethics without truth”, 
as he called it) stated that human beings are not free because we can demonstrate 
their freedom from a scientific viewpoint, human beings are free because “we can 
make them free” by “choosing to have the value of freedom in our ethics” (Scar-
pelli 1982).COntemPOrarY ISSUeS In BIOethICS: the natIOnaL anD regIOnaL COnteXt
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Predictive genetic tests and genetic determinism
Although determinism in its hard form has been largely disproven, it has spread 
again by the advances in genetics. According to genetic determinists15, we are our 
genes and nothing else but that. This implies that our behaviour and our life to-
tally depend on our genetic make-up. This is true, but only to some extent. Like 
other forms of hard determinism, genetic determinism has being denied both sci-
entifically and philosophically.
From a scientific point of view, the acceptance of the gene-environment interplay 
(Boncinelli 1998), including gene-environment correlation (the genetic influence 
on exposure to environment) and gene-environment interaction (genetic suscep-
tibility to environments, i.e. the impact of environmental factors may differ de-
pending on a person’s genetic make-up), has proven genetic determinism false.
From a philosophical point of view, hard determinism can be argued against by 
adopting the above mentioned compatibilist stance. Especially in those cases in 
which genetic tests predict a susceptibility to a certain disease, this knowledge can 
be used to amplify and not to reduce individual freedom. Let me put it in the fol-
lowing way. When a predictive genetic test identifies a susceptibility to a certain 
pathology, the detected gene mutation can be seen as a constitutional require-
ment16 (Ross 1975: 162–164), without which it would be impossible to intervene in 
one’s life. What do I mean? To develop a multifactoral genetic disorder, the gene 
mutation is a necessary but not sufficient factor, indeed interactions with envi-
ronmental factors are needed.
If this is true, it can be said that on many environmental factors the individual 
can have the opportunity to intervene (by changing some environmental condi-
tions), i.e. the occasional requirement. Ultimately, the choice if and how to inter-
vene or not depends exclusively on the agent’s personal motivations (motivation-
al requirement). Hence, knowing gene mutations can amplify the possibility to 
intervene to change the future of the agent’s life. Constitutional requirements do 
not invalidate free choice on the part of the agent, as the knowledge about their 
existence is a pre-condition in deciding if and how the agent wants to intervene 
(therapeutically, changing lifestyle etc.) to reduce the risk of developing a given 
pathology. If we agree with this line of reasoning, it becomes clear why different 
organizations and scientific literature (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002; Bates 
et al. 2003) have suggested since 2002 that expressions like ‘a gene for x’ is prob-
lematic and misleading, as it does not convey to the public the complexity of the 
15   As Lewontin underlines in a critical way (2005).
16   I borrow this terminology from Alf Ross 1975: 162–164. According to the author “the 
human act…demands the fulfilment of three sets of requirements: the constitutional, the 
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role of genetic factors in causal explanations of human behaviour, and why they 
have suggested not to employ such sentences.
To avoid public misunderstanding on this topic and at the same time to allow 
“individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new 
therapies”, the law has established some restrictions to genetic testing, which can-
not be considered, in my opinion, as too strict in limiting the right to research on 
the part of scientists.
Some conclusions
The determinists v anti-determinists debate (free will v determinism) has not lost 
its fascination, despite having been proven unfruitful, and scientifically as well 
as philosophically unfounded. In the age of genetics, however, the debate is still 
heated because of the spreading of genetic determinism due to many factors (eco-
nomic interests, new form of criminal policies in line with the Positivist School’s 
approach, mediatic pressure, etc.). 
Unlike the time in which the Positivist School’s approach tried to found crimi-
nal law on scientific advances in sociology, statistics etc., but without knowing 
that determinism’s theory would be scientifically disproven in the coming cen-
tury (Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy). Today, we can appeal both to the 
scientific evidence that proves hard determinism false, and to the philosophical 
trend (revisited from a classical to a modern view), that has inspired the relation-
ship between science and law, i.e. compatibilism. For these reasons, today, the de-
cision to rely on claims of genetic determinism is crudely ideological, and serves 
only to classify individuals, and to confine them in a fatalistic perception of their 
lives, making the exercise of control over them easier. 
Why then, is normative compatibilism the proper way to address the relationship 
between science and law? To appreciate this philosophical approach, we should 
keep in mind the following considerations.
If we consider that prescriptive statements are not derivable from assertions of 
facts or descriptive statements (naturalistic fallacy), it follows that when we value 
or disvalue, say, gene mutations, by choosing for instance to discriminate indi-
viduals on their genetic make-up as it results from predictive genetic testing, we 
are confusing ethics and nature. A given gene mutation is a fact, and the decision 
to interpret this fact in accordance with values or disvalues is a normative choice, 
that should be always clearly expressed, if we do not want to fall into ideology as 
Kelsen (Kelsen 1952) means it. The gene mutation potentially causing a future dis-
ease is a fact, and on this fact we cannot deny or affirm moral freedom or the right/
duty to non-discrimination. Facts and the assertion of facts (scientific realm) are 
useful to explain certain biological and natural phenomena, so that choices at COntemPOrarY ISSUeS In BIOethICS: the natIOnaL anD regIOnaL COnteXt
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the normative level (both ethical and legal) can be taken on assumptions free 
from misunderstandings on how certain biological or physical mechanisms work. 
However, the interpretation of facts or of natural phenomena belongs to the pre-
scriptive level. It presupposes ‘the choice to choose’ how to interpret any fact in a 
way functional for certain aims, such as deciding to use the genetic information 
in a way which most conforms to the state of facts. For example, not intentional-
ly avoiding to mention the fundamental role played by environmental factors, so 
that we can “make the human being free” despite its causal determination. 
Normative compatibilism allows a ‘functional coexistence’ (Salardi 2010) between 
two realms, i.e. science and ethics (and law as a part of ethics), which advance an 
overall view as well as a better understanding of both individual behaviour, and 
inter-personal relationships, since in this perspective the awareness of one’s own 
personal genetic make-up can be considered the starting point for sound knowl-
edge useful for the increase of an individual’s freedom of choice (Borsellino 1979; 
Borsellino 2009; Salardi 2010). 
De iure condito and de iure condendum law is trying to follow the compatibilist 
approach to deal with scientific advances in genetics. As for the relationship of 
law and ethics, which can be briefly expressed in what model of law can best lead 
to a peaceful and ‘moral’ society, law has chosen to permit genetic tests, but lim-
iting their potential misuse by providing, at different levels of the legal order, the 
protection of individuals from discrimination based on their genetic make-up, by 
considering non-discrimination and non-stigmatization as well as the self-deter-
mination principle as minimal values shared by all humans.
In this perspective, the law guarantees peaceful coexistence between different 
ethical views on the basis of minimal standards shared among human beings.
Primljeno: 15. decembar 2012.
Prihvaćeno: 4. januar 2013.
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Silvija Salardi
Determinizam i slobodna volja u veku genetike:  
teorijsko-pravna razmatranja prediktivne genetike
apstrakt 
tekst se bavi primenom prediktivnih analiza u medicinskim istraživanjima. Diskusija se 
odnosi samo na one vidove genetike kojima se pokušavaju prevazići ograničenja sadr-
žana u našem genetskom sklopu, pre svega ograničenja koja su izazvana mutacijama 
gena koja izazivaju ili mogu izazvati pojavu genetskih oboljenja. Pored etičkih pitanja 
vezanih za temu ove diskusije, tekst razmatra i pravna rešenja s različitih nivoa pravog 
poretka (međunarodni, evrospki, nacionalni). Cilj procene pravnih rešenja je da utvrdi 
koji je pravni model usvojen u sličaju bioetičkih pitanja kojima se bavi ovaj tekst. U tek-
stu se naglašava da zakon može doprineti (i već je na različitim nivoima i doprineo, me-
đunarodnom, evropskom i nacionalnom) afirmisanju i širenju etike odgovornosti.
Ključne reči  determinizam, slobodna volja, genetika, pravna regulativa u oblasti pre-
diktivne genetike.